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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
FEDERAL EMPLOYEES CREDIT 
UNION, a corporation, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
v. 
AGAPITO ESPI!WZA and MARY 
ESPINOZA, 
Defendants/Appellant. 
Case No. 16224 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF APPELLA~T'S 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Appeal from Judgment of the Second 
Judicial District Court for Weber 
County, The Honorable Ronald O. 
Hyde, presiding. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a decision of the'Second 
District Court of Weber County, which held that Defendants 
pledging of exempt property as loan security waived their 
statutory exemption rights without evidence of their in-
tention to do o. 
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DISPOSITION OF THE CASE ON APPEAL 
This Court issued a Per Curiam opinion on October 
10, 1979, summarily affirming the lower court without hear-
ing oral argument. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON REHEARING 
Appellant seeks an opportunity for oral argument 
and reversal of the decision of the District Court. 
ARGUMENT 
TEE GRANTING OF A SECURITY INTEREST IN 
STATUTORILY EXEMPT PROPERTY IS A WAIVER 
OF A RIGHT AND MUST BE KNOWINGLY AND 
INTENTIONALLY MADE. 
This Court stated in Clearfield State Bank v. 
Contos, 562 P.2d 622 (Utah 1977) that a person could pledge 
exempt property such as household furniture to secure a 
note. The Court mentioned this in dicta and disposed of the 
proposition in a few sentences. This is understandable 
since the issue was not briefed or argued in full by counsel. 
Appellant's brief in that case did not even mention the 
exemption statute at all. Respondent's brief in that case 
raised two points on appeal: 
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Point I: Constitutional and statutory 
rights of wife cannot be deter-
mined against her will; 
Point II: Wife cannot be deprived of her 
personal property without due 
process of law. 
This Court in Contos held that the Defendant (Mr. 
Contos) had no standing to raise defenses on behalf of a 
third party. 562 P.2d at 625. This holding disposed of 
both of the points raised by Respondent Contos. In his 
brief Respondent discussed the exemption statute but raised 
it only in relation to unprotected interests of the unrepresented 
wife. The Court's brief discussion of this point is certainly 
dicta. More importantly the issue raised in the present 
case was not before the Court in Contos and did not need to 
be resolved in that case. 
The Court in Contos footnoted the dicta discussed 
above to two Arkansas cases, Pope v. McBride, 207 Ark. 940, 
784 S.ll.2d 259 (1944) and Sieb's Hatcherfes v. Lindley, 111 
F.Supp. 705 (D. Ark. 1953). Neither of these cases addresses 
the issue at hand. Pope is focused on tenancies by the 
entirety and their effect on conveyances by only one of the 
tenants. There is no discussion of homestead or other 
property exemptions or the standards needed to waive such 
rights. 
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Sieb's Hatcheries is also primarily concerned with 
tenancies by the entirety in Arkansas and the possibility of 
fraudulent conveyances therewith. The case does discuss the 
homestead exemption, analagous to the property exemption 
involved in the instant case. There, however, the court 
held that "as to a homestead there can be no creditors and 
thus there can be no fraudulent conveyance of such property. 
111 F.Supp. at 715. Nothing in that case either seems to 
support the Court's discussion in Contos as it may apply to 
the present case. 
There is no dispute between the parties here that 
a person may sell or alienate his property, including property 
that is exempt by statute. Likewise, there is no dispute 
between the parties that a person may waive his or her 
rights, including one's right to claim an exemption as to 
certain property. The dispute is as to the standard to be 
applied before such a waiver or purported wai ~er is effecti~. 
Appellant's Brief at P.4 cites numerous Utah cases in other 
contexts holding that a waiver of any right must be knowingly 
and intentionally made. This standard has been reiterated 
by this Court as recently as last year in Sandberg v. Klein, 
576 P.2d 1291 (Utah 1978) at 1294, and should be applied 
here as well. 
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Other state courts have applied such a standard to 
the waiver of property exemptions by executing a mortgage. 
See e.g. Aetna Finance Company v. Antoine, 343 So.2d 1195 
(La. App. 1977) cited in Appellant's Brief at P. 5. Some 
courts have even held that the exemption right cannot be 
waived at all by mortgage. See e.g. Beneficial Consumer 
Discount Co. v. Hamlin, 398 A.2d 193 (Pa. Super. 1979). 
Appellant submits that the appropriate standard for analyzing 
such a waiver is the "knowing and intelligent" standard 
utilized by this Court in a variety of other contexts. The 
appropriateness of such a standard was not discussed or 
resolved by Contos by any stretch of the imagination. 
This Court has applied such a standard in relation 
to Utah's statutory.homestead exemption. This exemption, 
U.C.A. §28-1-1, et seq., is similar in purpose to the 
property exemptions of U.C.A. §78-23-1, et seq. Both are 
designed to provide a minimum amount of basic necessities of 
life to prevent total destitution of debtors. In discussing 
the homestead exemption and possible waiver thereof this 
Court stated: 
The homestead right of a surviving spouse 
may be waived. Such a waiver, however, 
must be established by clear and conclusive 
evidence and it must be shown that the 
party waiving actually intended to waive 
his homestead rights as such. In Re Dalton's 
Estate, 109 Ut. 503, 167 P.2d 690 at 691 (1946) 
-5-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In Re Dalton's Estate has never been overruled or 
modified. Arguably that case applied the "knowing and 
intentional" standard to personal property exe~ptions as 
well as to the homestead exemption. There the trial court 
ruled that the Respondent did not waive his homestead or 
exemot personal property rights. This Court affirmed that 
decision, which involved both real property and furniture. 
There is, in Appellant's Exhibit l (the 
agreement of May 8, 1944), no mention 
made of Dalton's homestead rights. There 
~s nothing in the record which indicates 
that Orin Dalton intended expressly to 
waive his homestead rights, and such 
specific intent cannot be implied from 
the general language of the agreement. 
167 P.2d at 692. 
While the agreement there was between the executrix of an 
estate and the decedent's husband and not a pledging of 
property to secure a loan as herein, the principles set out 
in Dalton's Estate are sound and should be applied to this 
case. Many other courts have supported these principles in 
the context of waiving a homestead exemption. See e.g. 
Mealy v. Martin, 468 P.2d 965 (Alaska 1970); In Re Estate 
of Funderburk, 521 P.2d 60 (Wash. App. 1974). Commentary on 
the Utah homestead exemption supports this analysis as well. 
See Summary of Utah Real Property Law (1978) at 207. 
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CONCLUSION 
This Court should schedule oral argument and fully 
consider Appellant's claims. An analysis and decision 
regarding the standard to be applied in establishing a 
waiver of property exemption rights is necessary to resolve 
implicit differences arising from prior cases decided by 
this Court. The appropriate standard should be the "knowing 
and intentional" standard applied by this Court in the 
closely related area of exempt homestead property. 
Respectfully submitted this 7_,, f!>-.21.. day of October, 
1979. 
UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, INC. 
::~:', '°/Ciellaot 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed a copy of the fore-
going Brief in Support of Appellant's Petition for Rehearing 
to Timothy Blackburn, Attorney for Respondent, 2605 Washington 
Boulevard, Ogden, Utah 84401, on this 
"J 7/ 
_)u day of 
7 -~/ ~ 'l ,z_,:/'r.../ 1979. 
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